Bold Executive Action and False Equivalence by Legomsky, Stephen H
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 2
Spring 2018
Bold Executive Action and False Equivalence
Stephen H. Legomsky
Washington University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the American Politics Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Legomsky, Stephen H. (2018) "Bold Executive Action and False Equivalence," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 2.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol23/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
Articles 
 
Bold Executive Action and False 
Equivalence 
 
Stephen H. Legomsky* 
 
Amidst the legal and political discourse following President 
Obama’s immigration executive actions and the polar opposite 
thrust of President Trump’s executive actions in this field, one 
hears a familiar refrain—a dire warning to liberals that zealous 
advocacy of humane immigration policies will come back to haunt 
us. Liberal executive actions in this field, it is said, set broader 
legal and political precedents and trigger conservative backlashes 
that open the door to anti-immigrant and other illiberal executive 
actions. Seeing no evidence of such a causal link, I disagree. To  
the contrary, the steady, principled advocacy of humane 
immigration policies is critical to the realization of positive 
outcomes and the defeat of harmful ones. 
These arguments have come from both directions. From the 
political right, they are meant to justify bold anti-immigrant 
executive action. These advocates cite DACA (Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals)1 and DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of 
 
* The John S. Lehmann University Professor Emeritus, Washington 
University School of Law. Thanks are owed to Peter Margulies, the Roger 
Williams University School of Law, and the student editors of the Roger 
Williams University Law Review. 
1. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on 
Immigration at the Rose Garden (June 15, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks- 
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Americans)2 as legal or political precedent for broad executive 
power. Additionally, they try to undermine immigrant advocates 
by pointing to our support of DACA and DAPA and thus accusing 
us of doing 180-degree turns now that the shoe is on the other  
foot. From the political left, the warnings are meant as a caution 
against overly bold progressive executive action that they fear 
might lend support to future conservative action. 
In 2012, the Obama Administration established a program 
known as “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (DACA).3 The 
program authorized “deferred action,” a long-established vehicle 
for prosecutorial discretion,4 for certain undocumented 
immigrants who had been brought to the United States as 
children. They had to apply individually, to have lived 
continuously in the U.S. since 2007, to meet several additional 
criteria, and to show they merited the favorable exercise of 
discretion.5 When granted, deferred action temporarily makes the 
recipient a low priority for deportation and eligible to apply for 
permission to work during the temporary period for which 
deferred action is granted.6 On September 5, 2017, the Trump 
 
 
president-immigration; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion- 
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
2. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals 
Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain 
Individuals Who are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_ 
memo_deferred_action.pdf. 
3. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note 
1. 
4. For a superb, comprehensive historical account of deferred action 
and related instruments of prosecutorial discretion, see SHOBA SIVAPRASAD 
WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
IMMIGRATION CASES (2015), especially ch. 4; see also Leon Wildes, The 
Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 
Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 819 (2004). 
5. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note 
1, at 1. 
6. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014). 
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Administration rescinded DACA.7 
In 2014, the Obama Administration established a second 
program known as “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans” 
(DAPA).8 This program authorized deferred action, again after 
individualized consideration, for certain parents of United States 
citizens and lawful permanent residents.9 A divided court of 
appeals panel preliminarily enjoined DAPA,10 and on June 15, 
2017 the Trump Administration rescinded it.11 
The idea that pro-immigrant executive action rests on 
premises that will later support anti-immigrant executive actions 
has surfaced in at least three contexts: legal precedent, political 
norms, and public backlash. In each of these contexts the critics 
argue that, by supporting President Obama’s executive actions or 
other inclusive immigration policies, we liberals are now hoisted 
by our own petards. Not all of these critics have made all of these 
arguments. But each of these arguments has been made by one or 
more individuals, as the following discussion will show. 
I. LEGAL PRECEDENT 
The common premise of the arguments addressed in this 
section is the need for consistency—in particular, the need to 
avoid double standards. In a thoughtful article on judicial review 
of the political branches’ immigration policymaking, Professor 
Margulies considers the division of power between the legislative 
and executive branches of government.12 One of his observations 
 
 
7. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum- 
rescission-daca. 
8. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson to León Rodríguez, supra 
note 2. 
9. Id. at 4. 
10. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d 
per curiam mem. by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
11. Memorandum for the President from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., to Stephen Miller, Assistant to the President & Senior 
Advisor to the President for Policy, on Rescinding Policy Providing for 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA) 1 (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications 
/2017-HQFO-00935%20Records.pdf. 
12. See Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial 
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is highly relevant here: “A model that views President Obama as a 
co-principal of Congress can hardly deny that role to President 
Trump.”13 
At that level of generality there is no reason to quibble. As 
usual, however, the devil is in the details. Reasonable minds can 
disagree as to whether a given assertion of executive authority 
really amounts to making the executive a “co-principal of 
Congress.”14 More important, bold executive actions are not 
fungible. They rest on different sources of law, different sets of 
facts, different policy goals, and different cost-benefit analyses. 
DACA and DAPA are bold executive actions that relate to 
immigration; so too are President Trump’s travel ban15 and his 
orders rescinding DACA and DAPA.16 That much they have in 
common. But the resemblance ends there. The legal issues are as 
different as night and day, as discussed in more detail below.17 
Whether any one of these actions can fairly be described as 
elevating the executive branch to the role of “co-principal of 
Congress,”18 therefore, or for that matter whether any one of these 
is legally flawed, tells us nothing about whether the same is true 
of any of the others. 
In a series of similarly thoughtful writings, Professor 
Blackman specifically targets DACA supporters and the parties 
challenging President Trump’s travel ban.19 Blackman  claims 
that their current legal challenges to President Trump’s executive 
actions contradict the arguments they previously made in 
defending the legality of pro-immigrant policies.20 In one article 
 
Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration (Roger Williams 
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 177, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029655. 
13. Id. at 6 n.23. 
14. Id. 
15. The current versions are Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 
45,161, 45,164–71 (Sept. 27, 2017) (nationals of specified countries) and Exec. 
Order No. 13,815, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,055 (Oct. 24, 2017) (refugees). 
16. See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke to James W. McCament, 
supra note 7; Memorandum from John F. Kelly to Stephen Miller, supra note 
11. 
17. See infra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
18. Margulies, supra note 12, at 6 n.23. 
19. See Josh Blackman, Commentary, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG, 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/c-v/#commentary (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
20. Josh Blackman, A Ludicrous Ruling That Trump Can’t End DACA, 
NAT’L REV. (Jan. 10, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/ 
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Blackman argues that “[i]mmigration advocates who ignore this 
venerable maxim [that Congress does not ‘hide elephants in 
mouseholes’] will have scant protection if future presidents 
exercise discretion that is less congenial to their desired 
reforms.”21 This was a reference to the use of that maxim in the 
court decision affirming a preliminary injunction of DAPA.22 As I 
have shown elsewhere, however, the provision in question was no 
mousehole.23 Even if it were, a future challenge to an anti- 
immigrant executive action would rest on the specific provisions of 
law relevant to that case. Unless the legal issues happened to be 
identical, a “mousehole” argument in one case would not support 
Professor Blackman’s dark forecast of “scant protection”24 in 
another case. 
Elsewhere, Professor Blackman mocks the State of 
Washington for “rel[ying] on the standing argument it once 
opposed [referring, presumably, to the defendants’ and amicus 
states’ arguments that Texas lacked standing to challenge DAPA] 
to seek a nationwide injunction against Trump’s executive 
order.”25 But the State of Washington hardly relied on any 
 
 
01/daca-court-ruling-trump-cant-end-daca/. 
21. Josh Blackman, Immigration Inside the Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 
37 (2015). 
22. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 760 n.86 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
23. Stephen H. Legomsky, Written Testimony of Stephen H. Legomsky 
Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the 
Judiciary, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 16–18 
(Feb. 25, 2015), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ 
Legomsky-Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Legomsky Testimony]. 
24. Blackman, supra note 21, at 37. 
25. Josh Blackman, DACA Recipient, Detained by ICE, Asserts 5th 
Amendment Violation for “Break[ing] the Promise Made to Him” Because 
of Grant of Lawful Presence, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Feb. 14, 2017), 
 http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/02/14/daca-recipient-detained-by- 
ice-asserts-5th-amendment-violation-for-breaking-the-promise-made-to-him- 
because-of-grant-of-lawful-presence/. The State of Washington is not a party 
to the case Professor Blackman describes; the plaintiff there is an individual 
DACA recipient challenging his detention. See Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus at 2, Ramirez Medina v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:17-cv- 
05110 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2017). I am assuming Professor Blackman is 
referring to the suit brought by the State of Washington to enjoin President 
Trump’s  travel  ban. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017). 
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standing argument it had once opposed.26 The argument that it 
opposed in Texas v. United States was that Texas had standing by 
virtue of the administrative costs it would incur in processing 
driver license applications filed by DAPA recipients.27 That 
position bears no resemblance to Washington’s asserted grounds 
for standing in its own challenge to President Trump’s travel 
ban—that the ban “is separating Washington families, harming 
thousands of Washington residents, damaging Washington’s 
economy, hurting Washington-based companies, and undermining 
Washington’s sovereign interest in remaining a welcoming place 
for immigrants and refugees.”28 Whether or not one finds those 
interests sufficient for standing, they have nothing to do with the 
argument that Washington opposed in the Texas litigation. 
In the same paragraph, Professor Blackman cites what he 
similarly believes is an inconsistency in the arguments of 
immigrant advocates: “The 5th Circuit [in the Texas litigation] 
found that the conferral of lawful presence made the policy illegal. 
Now, the [pro-DACA] lawyers are relying on that conclusion to 
bootstrap a claim that DACA is now a constitutionally protected 
interest—albeit an illegal one.”29 
That characterization misstates the arguments of the 
challengers’ lawyers. Yes, they rely partly on DACA’s conferral of 
lawful presence.30 But if Professor Blackman is suggesting that 
this reliance contradicts a position that other immigrant  
advocates took in defending DAPA against Texas’s earlier 
challenge, the inconsistency is not apparent. No DACA supporter 
of whom I am aware has ever disputed that deferred action gives 
rise to lawful presence. Nor could they; the memo creating DAPA 
expressly says it does.31 So Professor Blackman’s assertion seems 
to be, rather, that the DACA supporters are relying not just on the 
creation of lawful presence, but on the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the conferral of lawful presence makes DAPA illegal.32 But 
any argument that illegality is what gives the plaintiffs’ interests 
 
26. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
27. Texas, 787 F.3d at 748–54. 
28. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
29. Blackman, supra note 25. 
30. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 25, at 11. 
31. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note 
1, at 2. 
32. See Blackman, supra note 25. 
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constitutional protection would surely be a nonsequitur. For that 
reason alone, it is not surprising that the DACA supporters 
nowhere offer such a theory. And if Professor Blackman means 
only to suggest that the DACA supporters are relying on the 
conferral of lawful presence despite the Fifth Circuit’s holding, the 
obvious answer is that the district court in Washington is not 
bound by the Fifth Circuit’s controversial holding, one that we can 
safely assume the lawyers challenging the legality of the 
rescission do not share in any event. They would be on firm 
ground in resisting the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion. As I have  
argued elsewhere, DACA and DAPA are well within the legal 
authority of the executive branch, the Fifth Circuit’s poorly- 
reasoned 2–1 panel decision notwithstanding.33 At any rate, the 
pro-DACA lawyers’ argument that DACA confers lawful presence 
was not their principal argument; their main point was that, apart 
from lawful presence, DACA creates a “reasonable expectation” 
which, under current case law, can establish a constitutionally 
protected interest.34 They additionally assert a constitutionally 
protected interest in being free from imprisonment.35 For these 
many reasons, the claimed inconsistencies simply do not exist. 
Let us be clear about one fundamental fact: the specific legal 
issues in the litigation challenging DACA and DAPA have almost 
nothing relevant in common with the legal issues in either the 
travel ban litigation or the DACA rescission litigation. In the 
litigation challenging DAPA, the legal issues were whether Texas 
had standing based on its alleged expenses in processing driver 
licenses;36 whether DAPA violated the general overall spirit of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act;37 and whether DAPA contained 
too little discretion to be exempt from the notice-and-comment 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.38 In the travel 
 
33. Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 2–26. 
34. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 25, at 3–4. 
35. Id. at 14. 
36. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 747–54 (5th Cir. 2015). 
37. Id. at 754. 
38. Id. at 762–67. Texas also argued that, in issuing DAPA, President 
Obama had breached his constitutional duty to “take [c]are that the laws be 
faithfully executed.” Id. at 746 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). That 
argument, however, was superfluous. The only laws that Texas claimed the 
President had failed to execute faithfully were the immigration laws. Id. 
Either the President’s actions were consistent with the immigration laws, in 
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ban litigation, the issues required interpretation of a statutory 
provision empowering the President to ban classes of noncitizens; 
interpretation of another statutory provision barring specified 
forms of nationality discrimination; a fact question as to whether 
the travel ban had been motivated largely by animus toward 
Muslims; and a question as to whether—if such animus were 
found—the action would violate the constitutional prohibition on 
the establishment of religion.39 Finally, in the challenge to 
President Trump’s rescission of DACA, the issues were whether 
the rescission order was unconstitutionally motivated by anti- 
Mexican animus;40 whether it would violate due process for the 
Administration to divert to enforcement purposes the information 
voluntarily provided by the DACA applicants;41 whether the 
rescission was “arbitrary and capricious”;42 and whether the 
rescission order required use of the notice-and-comment  
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and an impact 
analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.43 The legal 
arguments made by immigrant advocates in the litigation 
challenging DAPA thus had little or no connection to those made 
in either the travel ban or the DACA rescission litigation.44 
The only commonality we are left with is that all these 
challenges were to bold executive actions that affect large 
numbers of people. At that level of generality, the similarity is 
 
 
which case there were no laws that he had failed to execute faithfully, or his 
actions were inconsistent with the immigration laws, in which case that 
statutory violation alone would render the policy unlawful. Either way, 
therefore, the constitutional claim is simply a restatement of the statutory 
argument. 
39. See Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673–75, 683–97, 702 (9th Cir. 
2017),  cert.  granted,  No.  17-965,  2018  WL  324357  (U.S.  Jan.  19,  2018); 
Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 650–51, 655–57 (9th Cir. 2017). 
40. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2–3, 52, New York 
v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05228 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017). 
41. Id. at 3, 52–53. 
42. Id. at 53. 
43. Id. at 54–55. 
44. One qualification is necessary. As just noted, both the DAPA 
challenge and the challenge to the rescission of DACA presented notice-and- 
comment issues. But those issues were not the same. In the former, the 
question was whether DAPA contained enough discretion to bring it within 
the statutory exemption for “general statements of policy.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(3)(A) (2016). Whether the rescission left room for administrative 
discretion was not an issue in the latter case. 
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unhelpful. The critics’ claims of inconsistency—and thus the 
suggestions that defense of a bold pro-immigrant initiative will 
later support an equally bold anti-immigrant initiative—rest 
simplistically on a false equivalence. 
A separate line of argument goes beyond immigration. 
Upholding DACA and DAPA, some fear, would provide legal 
clearance for future (now present) conservative Presidents to 
refuse to enforce a whole battery of laws they personally dislike. 
The parade of horribles has included refusals to enforce the laws 
on health care, taxes, the environment, voting rights, and 
employment discrimination.45 
These fears seem misplaced. I have no doubt that  
conservative Presidents could be tempted to do some or all of those 
things. President Trump is the best evidence that the fear of a 
conservative President dismantling important regulatory 
protections is real. But DACA and DAPA are not the culprits that 
could supply the legal ammunition for such actions. To suggest 
otherwise would require at least two logical leaps. 
First, neither DACA nor DAPA entails non-enforcement of the 
immigration laws. The resources Congress has appropriated for 
immigration enforcement, while massive,46 are still not enough to 
go after more than a very small fraction, roughly 4%, of the 
current undocumented population.47 DACA and DAPA reflect 
nothing more than determinations that the populations these 
programs address are exceptionally low removal priorities and 
that, given the policy decision not to pursue their removal, there 
are strong reasons to grant them deferred action and temporary 
work permits.48 No one has suggested that the Obama 
 
45. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, A slippery slope on immigration, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-a- 
slippery-slope-on-immigration/2014/11/18/501a11b0-6f5b-11e4-893f- 
86bd390a3340_story.html?utm_term=.3dff1db8f6de (citing the similar 
concerns of Professor David Martin, see infra note 57); Frustration over 
stalled immigration action doesn’t mean Obama can act unilaterally, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/frustration- 
over-stalled-immigration-action-doesnt-mean-obama-can-act- 
unilaterally/2014/08/05/9c7bc1c6-1c1c-11e4-ae54- 
0cfe1f974f8a_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4f9dddc98d33. 
46. See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
47. See Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 3. 
48. See id. at 29 (summarizing the policy rationales for DAPA and 
DACA). 
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Administration failed to fully use the immigration enforcement 
resources that Congress provided. 
Still, some might protest, even if upholding DACA and DAPA 
would not authorize complete non-enforcement of other laws, it 
would at least authorize partial non-enforcement. But even that  
is not true, for several reasons. First and foremost, every  
statutory system is different. In particular, they differ with 
respect to the degree of discretion that Congress has delegated to 
the relevant government agency. As just discussed, the litigation 
over the validity of DAPA turned on whether it violated the 
immigration laws (and the notice-and-comment provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act).49 A judicial precedent  holding 
that DACA and DAPA are consistent with the immigration laws 
would tell us nothing about whether some other, hypothetical 
executive action is authorized by the environmental laws, or the 
civil rights laws, or the tax laws. 
In addition, the executive branch has only whatever 
enforcement resources Congress has given it. Unlike the  case 
with DACA and DAPA, a future Administration would be on 
thinner legal ice if it refused to use even the resources it had. 
Among other things, such actions would invite serious questions 
as to whether the Administration is complying with the terms of 
the relevant appropriations Act.50 As with the feared immigration-
related actions, these hypothetically extreme executive actions in 
other far-flung areas of the law would require their own 
independent legal support. DACA and DAPA are distinguishable 
in too many ways. 
II. POLITICAL NORMS 
Legal issues aside, Professor Eric Posner worried that DAPA 
may modify political norms that control what the 
president can do . . . . Obama’s defenders thus argued 
that Republicans shouldn’t complain about his deferred- 
action plan because presidents George H.W. Bush and 
Ronald Reagan also deferred action against 
undocumented immigrants. Critics of Obama’s action 
worry that it establishes a broader political norm that 
 
49. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
50. See Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
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enables the president to achieve, through non- 
enforcement, ends unrelated to immigration.51 
Professor Posner then offered examples of regulatory 
constraints that a conservative future President might be tempted 
to neutralize through non-enforcement—financial regulation, 
Obamacare, climate regulation, and antitrust regulation.52 
Written before the election of Donald Trump, Professor Posner’s 
warning might seem prescient at first glance. 
He is quite right that supporters of DACA and DAPA have 
drawn political support from the eerily similar “Family Fairness” 
policies of Presidents Reagan and Bush.53 But that sole example  
of one President citing a predecessor’s prosecutorial discretion in 
support of his own policy is overstated. The fact that Presidents 
Reagan and Bush had adopted analogous policies several decades 
earlier was only one of the many arguments in support of DACA 
and DAPA.54 As a member of the Obama Administration 
integrally involved in the rollout and implementation of DACA, I 
can attest firsthand that this point was not a sine qua non for the 
President’s decision. Immigrant advocacy organizations can claim 
the lion’s share of the credit for that. The reference to the 
Reagan/Bush policy was merely a makeweight; there is no doubt 
that the policy would have been issued even without analogous 
programs in the 1980s. Moreover, there was no DACA and no 
DAPA when Presidents Reagan and Bush announced their 
programs.55 They did not need precedential political norms to do 
so. Neither did President Obama. 
But suppose it were otherwise. Suppose the political norms 
that underlay the Family Fairness policy of Presidents Reagan and 
Bush had been critical to President Obama’s political capacity to 
create DACA and DAPA. All of those policies protected classes of 
undocumented immigrants from imminent deportation. How any 
 
 
51. Eric A. Posner, Obama’s Immigration Order Is a Gift to Future 
Republican Presidents, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 23, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/120382/obamas-immigration-executive-order- 
gift-republican-presidents. 
52. Id. 
53. Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 23, 25. 
54. See id. at 2–29. 
55. DACA and DAPA were announced in 2012 and 2014, respectively. 
See supra notes 1 and 2. 
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of those policies establish or even solidify political norms that 
would legitimize anti-immigrant executive actions is not apparent. 
To the best of my knowledge, no one in the Trump Administration 
cited DACA and DAPA as precedents that support President 
Trump’s authority to impose a travel ban, or to rescind DACA, or 
to dismantle any non-immigration-related regulatory regimes.  
Nor could they. 
And that is my main objection—the effortlessness with which 
the various naysayers have assumed causation. Those who assert 
these claims are making a causal assumption that they should 
have some obligation to demonstrate rather than just assert. I  
will add one rhetorical question: Does anyone really believe that,  
if only President Obama had not established DACA and DAPA, 
President Trump would have zealously enforced the Affordable 
Care Act and the environmental laws? 
III. PUBLIC BACKLASH 
A third sort of “be careful what you wish for” argument 
encompasses executive actions like DACA and DAPA but takes a 
more generic form. The notion is that liberal immigration policies 
serve only to spur a public political backlash that in turn will 
create an opening for future repressive legislation or executive 
action.56 
Along those lines, at least one highly-respected scholar has 
argued that immigrant advocates need to support strong law 
enforcement measures as a prerequisite to achieving 
humanitarian reforms.57 But there are reasons that immigrant 
 
56. See, e.g., James F. Hollifield, Valerie F. Hunt & Daniel J. Tichenor, 
Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: The United States as an Emerging 
Migration State, 27 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 7, 14 (2008) (“If too many foreigners 
reside on the national territory, it may become difficult for a state to identify 
its population vis-à-vis other states. The national community may feel 
threatened, and there may be a social or political backlash against 
immigration.”); Jake Lichter, Mode IV and the Future of a Liberalized Global 
Immigration Policy, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 187, 193 (2012) (“[L]ower wages 
[from foreign competition] will come at a benefit to producers, but the 
possible backlash created on a domestic level among citizens may be severe.  
If immigration were to be truly liberalized it could become impossible for 
governments to protect against the problems associated with social 
dumping.”). 
57. David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement is Not Just for Restrictionists: 
Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. & 
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advocates have not prioritized, or even shown affirmative support 
for, still more enforcement. One reason is that excessive law 
enforcement can produce cruel outcomes.58 
The other reason is the already-bloated immigration 
enforcement budget. The numbers are staggering: The Border 
Patrol budget is now more than fourteen times what it was in 
1990.59 The ICE interior enforcement operations budget has 
tripled since 2004.60 From 1986 to 1996, the interval between the 
passage of two major immigration enforcement laws,61  the 
number of Border Patrol agents doubled; that number doubled 
again from 1996 to the attacks of September 11 in 2001, and it 
doubled yet again in the decade following the 9/11 attacks.62 We 
now spend more money on immigration enforcement than is spent 
by “all other principal federal criminal law enforcement agencies 
combined.”63 
Yet, even with these continual exponential increases in 
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(Border Patrol budget increased from $263 million in 1990 to $3.8 billion in 
2016). 
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CRIMINAL ALIENS 19 (2013) (total ICE interior operations budget increased 
from $959.7 million in 2004 to $2.75 billion in 2013). 
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100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1986)); Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. 
62. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42138, BORDER 
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63. Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., U.S. Spends More on 
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enforcement resources, immigrant advocates overwhelmingly 
advocated zealously for the comprehensive immigration reform 
(CIR) bill that the Senate passed in 2013—a bill that would have 
more than doubled the size of the Border Patrol yet again,64 added 
much more border fence,65 and required other border fortification 
measures.66 It would have made the automated employment 
verification system known as E-Verify mandatory for all 
employers,67 and it would have adopted a wide range of other 
interior enforcement measures.68 Immigrant advocates were not 
intransigent about any of those provisions. They accepted these 
massive enforcement measures as a tradeoff for legalization and 
increases in legal immigration. It is true that we liberals have 
generally resisted calls for turning state and local police into 
junior immigration agents, as well as calls to punish so-called 
sanctuary cities, but out of important concerns that in fact are 
shared by many law enforcement professionals.69 
Just as DACA and DAPA created neither legal nor political 
norms that somehow legitimize anti-immigrant executive actions 
like the travel ban, then, I see no evidence that DACA and DAPA 
are responsible for a public political backlash against immigrants. 
Nor is there evidence of a more specific causal link between either 
DACA or DAPA and President Trump’s travel ban or any of his 
anti-regulatory executive actions. 
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It is easy to hypothesize that the Obama executive actions 
have made possible a range of extreme conservative non- 
enforcement actions, either by setting dangerous legal precedents 
or by altering existing political norms. But coming up with actual 
evidence of any but-for causal connection is harder. If it exists, I 
have yet to see it. 
CONCLUSION 
The gist of these various criticisms has been that those of us 
who have defended either the legality or the wisdom of DACA and 
DAPA, or who have advocated for other progressive immigration 
policies, have painted ourselves into a corner. The notion is that 
we have unwittingly laid the legal and political groundwork for a 
broad executive power to do cruel things to immigrants. In some  
of these criticisms there is even the subtle inference that we 
immigrant advocates have exposed ourselves as hypocrites—and 
short-sighted hypocrites at that—when we now question the 
wisdom and the legality of President Trump’s executive actions on 
immigration. 
Of course, if it is hypocrisy to make one argument for the 
purpose of defending DACA and DAPA and later resist an 
analogous argument for broad executive power, then it is just as 
hypocritical to challenge the legality of DACA and DAPA and then 
later assert that same argument the moment it helps support 
anti-immigrant executive actions. What is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander. But I want to get beyond the name-calling, 
not just because name-calling is unhelpful, but because, as this 
article demonstrates, neither side is being inconsistent, much less 
hypocritical. Both the legal and the policy analyses of the various 
challenged actions are simply different. 
To be clear, I do not suggest that no pro-immigrant policy 
could possibly spawn an anti-immigrant backlash. My suggestion 
is more modest. I see no evidence that the kinds of positions that 
critics have recently been faulting liberals for advocating—support 
for DACA and DAPA, opposition to the travel ban and to the 
DACA rescission and to the severe reduction in refugee 
admissions at a time when the needs of the world’s refugees have 
never been greater—have contributed in any way to any of the 
extreme anti-immigrant measures recently adopted or proposed. 
To the contrary, I predict that public opinion will ultimately—and 
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it might take time—force the reversal of at least some of these 
policies. 
So I say that we immigrant advocates should follow our own 
instincts, rather than be guided by what our critics tell us our 
strategies should be. And that means we should continue to fight 
tooth and nail for immigrants and refugees and for all the values 
that we ourselves believe in. 
